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Abstract
We study the efficiency of simple auctions in the presence of complements. Devanur et al. [11]
introduced the single-bid auction, and showed that it has a price of anarchy (PoA) of O(logm) for
complement-free (i.e., subadditive) valuations. Prior to our work, no non-trivial upper bound on
the PoA of single bid auctions was known for valuations exhibiting complements. We introduce a
hierarchy over valuations, where levels of the hierarchy correspond to the degree of complementarity,
and the PoA of the single bid auction degrades gracefully with the level of the hierarchy. This
hierarchy is a refinement of the Maximum over Positive Hypergraphs (MPH) hierarchy [16], where
the degree of complementarity d is captured by the maximum number of neighbors of a node in the
positive hypergraph representation. We show that the price of anarchy of the single bid auction
for valuations of level d of the hierarchy is O(d2 log(m/d)), where m is the number of items. We
also establish an improved upper bound of O(d logm) for a subclass where every hyperedge in the
positive hypergraph representation is of size at most 2 (but the degree is still d). Finally, we show that
randomizing between the single bid auction and the grand bundle auction has a price of anarchy of
at most O(
√
m) for general valuations. All of our results are derived via the smoothness framework,
thus extend to coarse-correlated equilibria and to Bayes Nash equilibria.
1 Introduction
A central focus of algorithmic mechanism design is to decide how to allocate limited resources to strategic
agents while taking into account computational limitations. A great deal of work has studied truthful
mechanisms, and while many times achieving guarantees that match the algorithmic problem (in which
the agents are not strategic but always truth telling), many of the designed mechanisms turned out quite
complex algorithmically and complicated to describe.
Practical concerns have led recent study to forgo truthfulness in lieu of simple mechanism formats.
Simultaneous item auctions (SIAs), in particular, have constant-factor welfare approximations at equilib-
rium for subadditive buyers [18], and have an arguably simple format: each buyer submits a single sealed
bid for each item separately, and each item’s winner is the highest bidder for that item. Unfortunately,
SIAs have a marked lack of simplicity in another respect: there is initial evidence that the problem of
computing Nash equilibria [14], approximate Bayes Nash equilibria, correlated equilibria, or verifying
best-responses [4] are likely intractable.
So, while SIAs have a simple format, the strategic behavior induced by the mechanism is quite complex.
A mechanism with a simple format but one that is difficult to play leads one to question the underlying
assumption that an equilibrium will be reached, and in turn to question the applicability of the price of
anarchy bounds.
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Recent work [11] introduced another mechanism whose format was “simple” with a strategy space
small enough that no-regret learning algorithms (for computing correlated and coarse correlated equilibria
of the mechanism) run in polynomial time. This mechanism was coined the single bid mechanism, and
was shown to have a Price of Anarchy (PoA) of O(logm) for subadditive buyers, where m is the number
of items. This upper bound on the PoA, while worse than that of SIAs, should apply to the welfare
achieved by polynomially bounded agents (unlike those for SIAs).
The format of the single-bid mechanism was generalized by Braverman et al. [3], who defined the
notion of a priori learnable interpolation (ALI) mechanisms. An ALI mechanism has two phases. First,
agents report O(logm) bits of information to the mechanism. The mechanism computes some truthful
mechanism as a function of all agents’ reports. Second, the agents interact with this truthful mechanism.
Since the second interaction is with a truthful mechanism, agents strategize only over their reports in
the first phase. To find reports for the first round which form an equilibrium, one can trivially employ
no-regret learning in polynomial time over the possible poly(m) reports. Thus, these mechanisms are
strategically simple. If the truthful mechanism selected at the second phase always has a simple format,
then the ALI mechanism will also have a simple format.
Both SIAs and single-bid auctions provide good approximation guarantees for complement-free (i.e.,
subadditive) bidders. However, valuations with complementarities arise naturally in many contexts,
such as radio spectrum auctions, auctions for landing and takeoff time slots in airports, auctions for
computational resources in the cloud, and more (see [8]).
In this work, we aim to design mechanisms for bidders with complementarities, which simultaneously
approximate optimal welfare at equilibrium, have a simple format, and are strategically simple (as defined
implicitly by Devanur et al. [11] and formally by Braverman et al. [3]). Formally, we wish to find
mechanisms that run in polynomial time, whose equilibria have high welfare, and whose equilibria can be
found in a computationally efficient manner, when bidders’ valuations are not necessarily subadditive.
Several classes of valuations with restricted complements have been proposed in the literature: (1)
positive hypergraphs with rank at most k (PH-k), where the valuation is represented by a weighted
hypergraph, the hyperedges have positive weights, and are of size at most k. The valuation for a set of
items S is the sum of the weights of the hyperedges contained in S. (2) maximum over PH-k (MPH-k),
where the value for a set of items S is the maximum value assigned to S across multiple PH-k valuations.
(3) supermodular-d (SM-d), where the following graph is considered: the nodes correspond to goods,
and an edge (i, j) indicates complementarity between the goods i and j1. The complementarity level d
corresponds to the maximum degree of any node in the graph.
While for SIAs, the PoA for MPH-k is bounded by 2k [16], for single bid auctions, the PoA can be
linear in m even for PH-2.
Our main result is that a refinement of the MPH-k hierarchy captures the degradation of the single
bid auction in the presence of complements. This refinement is described next. The number of neighbors
of a node in the PH representation of a valuation is the number of nodes with which a node shares a
hyperedge. Our hierarchy, called Maximum over Positive Supermodular d (MPS-d), is a maximum over
a collection of PH valuations in which the maximum number of neighbors of any node is bounded by d.
Clearly, this constraint implies that each valuation in the collection is also in PH-d. One can verify that
this refinement of PH-d is equivalent to the intersection of PH and SM-d. This hierarchy is complete;
the highest level of the hierarchy, MPS-m, captures all monotone functions. We show that the price of
anarchy of the single bid auction degrades gracefully with the degree of the MPS-d hierarchy. This is
cast in the following theorem.
Theorem: When agents have MPS-d valuations, the single-bid auction has a price of anarchy of at most
(d+1)
1−e−(d+1) · (d+ 2) ·H md+1 (= O(d
2 log(m/d))) w.r.t. coarse correlated equilibria2.
We also show that for a subclass of MPS-d valuations, where for every PH representation in the
collection every hyperedge is of size at most 2 (i.e., where weights are given only to nodes and edges in
1Goods i and j are said to exhibit complementarity if there exists some set S such that v(j|S ∪ i) > v(j|S).
2For ease of exposition Hx denotes the x-th harmonic number when x is an integer and Hbxc + 1 otherwise.
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the graph), and the number of neighbors of a node is bounded by d (i.e., the intersection of PH-2 and
SM-d), the price of anarchy is at most O(d logm).
We prove this by defining an extension of the constrained homogeneous class [11], called d-constrained
homogeneous (d-CH), which allows for complements. Our proof proceeds in two steps. We first show
that the d-CH class pointwise approximates MPS-d valuations. We then show that the price of anarchy
of the single bid auction with d-CH valuations is bounded by O(d2 log(m/d)).
The above results imply a good price of anarchy for valuations that lie in low levels of the MPS-d
hierarchy. We then address the problem of simple auctions for general valuations. We show that ran-
domizing between the single bid auction and the grand bundle auction (where the grand bundle is sold
via a first price auction) obtains a price of anarchy of at most O(
√
m) for general valuations. Notably,
running the two auctions in parallel (by soliciting independent bids) and choosing the better outcome of
the two results in a price of anarchy of Ω(m). The desired result is obtained by randomizing between the
two auction formats.
Theorem: The mechanism that randomizes between the single bid auction and the grand bundle auction
achieves a price of anarchy of at most 4
√
m
1−e−1 for general valuations.
This bound matches the best poly-time welfare approximation by truthful mechanisms (assuming
access to a demand oracle) [13, 15, 22, 28]. It is also known that SIAs cannot achieve a better price of
anarchy bound for general valuations [21]. Finally, it should be noted that there exists a deterministic
mechanism that has a price of anarchy of at most O(
√
m) for general valuations [24].
1.1 Related work
There has been a great deal of recent focus on simple mechanism design. These mechanisms achieve
simplicity of format while trading off the optimality of the allocation they produce; the efficiency of
simple, non-truthful mechanisms is measured using the price of anarchy. The goal of this line of research
has been to design simple mechanisms whose price of anarchy is as small as possible in as general a setting
as possible.
Sequential first-price item auctions have been shown to yield a constant price of anarchy for unit-
demand bidders, with respect to subgame perfect equilibrium3 [23] and Bayes-Nash equilibria [31]. This
efficiency breaks for more general classes of valuations than unit-demand bidders: even with one additive
bidder and n− 1 unit-demand bidder, the pure Nash PoA can be Ω(m) [19].
The techniques for upper-bounding the Bayes-Nash PoA were shown to be generally useful: if one
bounds a mechanism’s PoA using a smoothness argument (introduced for auctions by Syrgkanis and
Tardos [32], which is closely related to the smoothness of a game [29]), then PoA guarantees naturally
extend to coarse correlated equilibria of the complete information game as well as Bayes-Nash equilibria.
The study of simultaneous item auctions was initiated by Christodoulou et al. [7], who showed that
when buyers’ valuations are submodular and i.i.d., the Bayesian PoA of second-price SIAs is at most 2,
and that Pure Nash equilibria can be computed in polynomial time in the full-information setting for
submodular buyers.
First-price simultaneous item auctions have been studied by Hassidim et al. [21]. They showed that
pure Nash equilibria (when they exist) are fully efficient, but that mixed equilibria can have PoA of Ω(
√
m)
for general valuations. In addition, they showed that the price of anarchy for both coarse correlated
equilibria with complete information and Bayes-Nash equilibria is O(m) for general valuations, O(logm)
for subadditive valuations, and O(1) for XOS valuations.
SIAs were then shown by Feldman et al. [18] to have constant PoA at Bayes-Nash equilibria for
subadditive buyers, for both first and second price payment rules. This result is tempered somewhat by a
string of evidence suggesting that the problem of computing Nash equilibria [14] (for subadditive bidders),
approximate Bayes-Nash equilibria (even for a mix of unit-demand and additive bidders), correlated
equilibria, or verifying best-responses [4] are likely intractable.
3The natural extension of Nash Equilibrium to sequential games.
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Another simple auction format that does allow for efficient computation of its coarse correlated equi-
libria (using no-regret learning algorithms and demand oracles) is the single-bid auction. In this auction,
each bidder submits a single real number, and buyers (in descending order of their bids) choose a bundle
amongst the remaining items, paying their bid for each item. This auction format was introduced by De-
vanur et al. [11], where the authors showed its price of anarchy of O(logm) for coarse correlated equilibria
with subadditive bidders. The computational efficiency relied on the mechanism having a single round
of strategic play which has a small action space, followed by a round of truthful behavior where agents
select a utility-maximizing bundle. Braverman et al. [3] showed that this was essentially the best welfare
one could achieve using any interpolation protocol which first has a single round of strategic play over a
small action space, followed by some non-adaptive posted price mechanism.
Lucier and Borodin [24] give a deterministic greedy mechanism that has O(
√
m) price of anarchy.
There are also truthful mechanisms that give O(
√
m) approximation to welfare, and run in poly time
given an access to a demand oracle [13, 15, 22].
Several notions of hierarchical restricted complements have been introduced in the literature. Abraham
et al. [1] introduce positive hypergraph representations of valuations with rank at most k, PH-k, give
k-approximation algorithms for welfare approximation and O(logkm)-approximate truthful mechanisms
for this class (and show the algorithmic result is the best possible in polynomial time unless P = NP ).
Feige and Izsak [17] introduce the notion of supermodular degree (at most) d, SM-d. When valuations
are in SM-d, they show APX-hardness of answering demand queries for SM-d for d ≥ 3, and construct
two (d + 2)-approximation algorithms for welfare maximization. Feige et al. [16] introduce a complete
hierarchy of monotone functions, the maximum over positive hypergraphs with rank at most k, MPH-k.
They give a (k + 1)-approximation to welfare maximization for this class, and show that SIAs have a
price of anarchy at most 2k when buyers’ valuations are contained in MPH-k.
Simple auction design has also been studied in the context of revenue maximization, both in single-
parameter [10, 12, 20, 27] and multiparameter [2, 5, 6, 30, 34] contexts.
Organization of the paper In section 2 we formally define the setting and introduce our refined
hierarchy, MPS-d. In section 3 we prove our main results, namely upper and lower bounds on the price of
anarchy of the single bid auction with MPS-d valuations. In section 4 we prove that randomizing between
the single bid auction and the grand bundle auction achieves a price of anarchy of O(
√
m) for general
valuations. We conclude in Section 5 with a discussion and some open problems.
2 Preliminaries
A combinatorial auction design problem consists of a set N of n agents, and a set of goods [m] =
{1, 2, . . . ,m}. Each agent i has a private valuation function vi : 2[m] → R+. We use v to denote the
valuation profile (vi)i∈N . We also write v = (vi,v−i), where v−i denotes the valuations of all agents
other than i. We design auctions which allocate each agent i a set of goods Si, such that the social
welfare SW(S) =
∑
i vi(Si) is (approximately) maximized. Let OPT(v) be an allocation that maximizes
the social welfare for the valuation profile v. Fixing an auction and the behavior of all n agents, each
agent is charged some payment Pi ≥ 0. An agent i with valuation vi who is allocated a set of items Si
and charged Pi has quasi-linear utility ui = vi(S)− Pi. We will assume agents will behave to maximize
this utility.
A mechanism is truthful if truth-telling is a dominant strategy; i.e., each agent maximizes its utility
by reporting truthfully, regardless of its valuation and other agents’ actions. An interpolation mechanism
is a communication protocol with two phases. The first phase is non-truthful, and its output is a truthful
mechanism.
Definition 1 (Braverman et al. [3]) An interpolation mechanism is a priori learnable if the first phase
contains a single simultaneous broadcast round of communication, and the per-agent communication is
O(logm).
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The following observation describes the key property that motivates the study of a priory learnable
interpolation (ALI) mechanisms.
Observation 2.1 [3] An agent can run a regret-minimizing algorithm over her strategies in an a priori
learnable interpolation mechanism (ALI) in time/space poly(m). Therefore, a correlated equilibrium of
any ALI can be found in poly-time, and correlated equilibria arise as the result of poly-time distributed
regret minimization.
The Single-bid auction The single-bid auction, recently introduced by Devanur et al. [11], is an ALI
mechanism. In the first phase the auctioneer solicits a single bid bi ∈ R+ from each agent i. In the
second phase the auctioneer sequentially approaches the agents, in a decreasing order of their bids (ties
are broken arbitrarily), and offers each agent i to purchase any of the items that have not been purchased
yet, at a per-item price of bi. We assume that agents maximize their utility: when offered a set of items
U ⊆ [m], agent i selects a set Si ∈ arg maxS⊆U vi(Si)− |Si| · bi. Notice that fixing the first phase of the
single-bid auction, the second phase is truthful; that is, reporting a set in arg maxS⊆U{vi(Si)− |Si| · bi}
maximizes utility. Therefore, we assume that agent i behaves strategically only when reporting her bid in
the first phase, and truthfully selects a utility-maximizing set in the second phase. Assuming that a single
bid can be expressed using communication size of O(logm), the singe bid auction is an ALI mechanism.
Price of Anarchy and smoothness. The allocation resulting from strategic play in the single-bid
auction can result in a sub-optimal allocation of goods. Observation 2.1 implies that agents employing no-
regret algorithms will converge to an (approximate) correlated or coarse correlated equilibrium. Therefore,
it is of interest to provide efficiency guarantees on correlated and coarse equilibria. This efficiency is
measured via the price of anarchy (PoA), which is the ratio of the optimal social welfare to the welfare
at the worst possible equilibrium. Given an equilibrium eq, denote by SW(eq) the social welfare at this
equilibrium.
Definition 2 Let E denote any solution concept for mechanism M, and let V be a class of valuation
profiles. Then the price of anarchy (PoA) and the price of stability (PoS) of M with respect to E when
the agents’ valuation profile is in V are:
PoA = max
v∈V
max
eq∈E
SW(OPT (v))
SW(eq)
PoS = max
v∈V
min
eq∈E
SW(OPT (v))
SW(eq)
All our positive results apply to coarse correlated equilibria and Bayes-Nash equilibria.
Definition 3 (Coarse Correlated Equilibrium) An α-coarse correlated equilibrium is a joint distribution
σ over bid vectors, such that for each agent i and bid b′i:
E
b∼σ
[ui(b)] ≥ E
b∼σ
[ui(b
′
i,b−i)]− α
The smoothness notion was introduced by Roughgarden [29] for general games, and Syrgkanis and
Tardos [32] applied it to mechanisms. The smoothness framework provides a method for proving price of
anarchy upper bounds for various solution concepts.
Definition 4 (Syrgkanis and Tardos [32]) A mechanism M is (λ, µ)-smooth for a class of valuations
V = ×iVi if for any valuation profile v ∈ V, there exists a (possibly randomized) action profile a∗i (v) such
that for every action profile a:∑
i
E
a′i∼a∗i (v)
[ui(a
′
i,a−i; vi)] ≥ λ · SW(OPT (v))− µ
∑
i
Pi(a) (1)
Theorem 2.2 (Syrgkanis and Tardos [32]) If a mechanism is (λ, µ)-smooth then the price of anarchy
w.r.t. coarse correlated equilibria is at most max{1,µ}λ .
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2.1 Categories of valuation functions
A set function f : 2[m] → R+ is normalized if f(∅) = 0 and monotone if f(T ) ≤ f(S) for every T ⊆ S.
As standard, we assume that all valuations are normalized and monotone.
A hypergraph representation of a set function f is a (normalized, but not necessarily monotone) set
function h such that for every set S ⊆ [m] it holds that f(S) = ∑T⊆S h(T ). One can easily verify that
every set function f has a unique hypergraph representation h.
A set function is complement-free, or subadditive, if for all S, T ⊆ [m] it holds that f(S ∪ T ) ≤
f(S) + f(T ).
When studying a class of valuations V, it can be useful to also study the class max(V), as defined
below.
Definition 5 Given a class of valuations V, the class max(V) is the class of all valuations that can be
represented as a maximum over a collection of valuations from V, i.e., max(V) = {f : ∃G ⊆ V : ∀S ⊆
[m], f(S) = maxg∈G g(S)}.
In this paper we focus on valuation functions that exhibit complements. The following hierarchies of
valuations with complements have been considered in the literature.
Maximum over positive hypergraphs [16] The class PH (positive-hypergraph) is the class of all
functions f whose hypergraph representation h has nonnegative edges. The class PH-k contains all
functions f ∈ PH for which every set T with h(T ) > 0 satisfies |T | ≤ k. The class maximum over PH-k
(MPH-k) is the class max(PH-k). Unlike PH-k, MPH-k is a complete hierarchy: for every set function f ,
there exists some k ≤ m such that f is in MPH-k (in particular, all functions are in MPH-m).
The supermodular degree [17] The supermodular degree measures the extent to which any set func-
tion f exhibits supermodular behavior. For an item j and set S, denote by f(j|S) = f(S ∪ j) − f(S)4
the marginal value of item j given S. The supermodular dependency set of item j is defined as
Dep+(j) = {j′ : ∃S ⊆ [m] so that f(j|S ∪ j′) > f(j|S)}. The supermodular degree of f is defined
as maxj∈[m]
∣∣Dep+(j)∣∣. The class supermodular degree d (SM-d) contains all the set functions with super-
modular degree at most d. Clearly, the SM-d hierarchy is complete, as any set function has supermodular
degree at most m− 1.
2.2 A refined hierarchy of restricted complements
The lowest level in the MPH-k hierarchy (MPH-1) is contained in the class of subadditive valuations.
It follows from Devanur et al. [11] that for MPH-1 valuations the price of anarchy is upper bounded by
e
e−1Hm (where Hm is the m’th harmonic number). However, this positive result does not extend beyond
the lowest level of MPH (or even PH).
Observation 2.3 [26] The single bid auction has price of stability of at least m when agents have valu-
ations in PH-2.
proof. A t-star-graph, centered at j, is a graph with t nodes, where there is an edge between the
center node (j) and each one of the other t − 1 nodes. A t-star-shaped valuation is a valuation with a
t-star-graph hypergraph representation, in which all edges have weight 1.
Consider two agents, a and b, and the items [m]. Let va be an m-star-shaped valuation, centered at
item 1. Therefore, for all T ⊆ [m], va(T ) = |T |− 1 if 1 ∈ T and 0 otherwise. By construction, va ∈ PH-2.
Agent b only wants item 1 for a value of (m− 1)/m+ . For agent a to purchase item 1 in equilibrium,
it must pay at least (m− 1)/m + , otherwise, agent b can bid slightly higher than a’s bid and improve
its utility. However, if agent a acquires a set T 3 1 for a price p per item, its utility is |T | · (1 − p) − 1.
Therefore, if agent a bids more than (m − 1)/m, buying any set of items yields negative utility. As a
4We abuse notation and write S ∪ j instead of S ∪ {j}
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result, at any equilibrium, agent b gets item 1, agent a has 0 value, and the social welfare is (m−1)/m+.
In the optimal outcome, agent a gets all the items and the social welfare is m−1. Therefore, the fraction
of the optimal welfare that is achieved in any pure equilibrium is (m−1)/m+m−1 = 1/m+

m−1 . 
This bound is essentially tight. Indeed, it is easy to show5 that the single bid auction is ((1 −
e−m)/m, 1)-smooth for general valuations, implying a price of anarchy of at most m/(1 − e−m). This
example demonstrates that the second level of the MPH hierarchy contains valuations that render the
worst possible setting for the single bid auction. While one may interpret this result to imply that single
bid auctions are hopeless in the presence of complements, we show that viewing restricted complements
using a different lens reveals the effect of the level of complementarity on the performance of the auction.
In particular, we establish positive results for a refined hierarchy, which combines the structural properties
of both SM-d and MPH-k valuations. One would hope that the SM-d hierarchy, by itself, would enable
positive price of anarchy results. This is left as an open problem of this work.
Maximum over Positive-Supermodular-d Positive Supermodular d (PS-d) functions are functions
that have a PH representation, and furthermore their supermodular degree is at most d. Thus, in PS-d
valuations each item can have at most d items in its supermodular dependency set (in the sense of [17]).
Definition 6 (Maximum over Positive-Supermodular-d) The class Positive Supermodular (PS-d) is de-
fined as PS-d = SM-d ∩ PH, and the class MPS-d is defined as MPS-d= max(PS-d).
Lemma 2.4 shows that PS-d can be equivalently defined as the class of valuations with PH represen-
tation in which the number of neighbors of every node is at most d. This trivially implies that PS-d is
contained in PH-(d+ 1).
Lemma 2.4 Let v be a valuation in PS-d with a hypergraph representation w. For any two items j, j′ ∈
[m], it holds that j′ ∈ Dep+(j) if and only if there exists a hyperedge e for which we > 0 and {j, j′} ⊆ e.
proof. For an item j 6∈ S it holds that v(j|S) = ∑e⊆S∪j we −∑e⊆S we = ∑e⊆S∪j:j∈e we, therefore, for
two items j′ 6= j not in S it holds that: v(j|S ∪ j′) − v(j|S) = ∑e⊆S∪{j,j′}:j∈e we −∑e⊆S∪j:j∈e we =∑
e⊆S∪{j,j′}:{j,j′}⊆e we. Therefore j
′ ∈ Dep+(j) if and only if the last sum is positive for some S ∈
[m] \ {j, j′}, which in turn holds if and only if we > 0 for some e so that {j, j′} ⊆ e. 
The MPS-d hierarchy is complete6, i.e., for every monotone valuation f there exists some d ≤ (m− 1)
such that f ∈ MPS-d.
3 The Single Bid Auction In The Presence Of Complementari-
ties
We now present the main result of this section, namely, that the welfare in any coarse correlated equilib-
rium of the single-bid auction, when buyers’ valuations are in MPS-d, is an approximation to the optimal
welfare.
Theorem 3.1 For agents with valuations in MPS-d, the coarse correlated price of anarchy of the single-
bid auction is no more than 1
1−e−(d+1) (d+ 1)(d+ 2) ·H md+1 .
Specifically, we show that when agents have MPS-d valuations, the single bid auction is a ( 1−e
−(d+1)
(d+1)·(d+2)·H m
d+1
, 1)-
smooth mechanism.
In addition, we prove a stronger upper bound of 2(d+1)1−e−2 ·Hm/2 when agents have max(PH-2 ∩ SM-d)
valuations, which is a strict subclass of MPS-d. We also show a PoS lower bound of Ω(d+ logmlog logm ) when
agents have PH-2 ∩ SM-d valuations.
5As a corollary from Lemma 4.4
6 Since PS-(m-1) = SM-(m-1) ∩ PH = PH, we get that MPS-(m-1) = MPH-m.
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The following proof method for establishing the smoothness of a mechanism with respect to a class of
valuations V was presented in Devanur et al. [11]: first show smoothness for a restricted class of valuations
V ′. Then, show that the class V can be pointwise β-approximated by the restricted class V ′. Pointwise
approximation is defined as follows:
Definition 7 [11] [pointwise β-approximation] A valuation class V is pointwise β-approximated by a
valuation class V ′ if for any valuation v ∈ V and for any set S ⊆ [m], there exists a valuation v′ ∈ V ′
such that β · v′(S) ≥ v(S) and for all T ⊆ [m] it holds that v′(T ) ≤ v(T ).
Note that pointwise β-approximation is less restrictive than mapping each valuation v ∈ V to a single
valuation v′ ∈ V ′ that approximates it everywhere, yet smoothness of a mechanism for valuations in V ′
implies smoothness for the larger class V.
Lemma 3.2 [11] If a mechanism for a combinatorial auction setting is (λ, µ)-smooth for the class of
valuations V ′ and V is pointwise β-approximated by V ′, then it is
(
λ
β , µ
)
-smooth for the class V.
A constraint-homogeneous (CH) valuation is an additive valuation such that the value of every item
is either 0 or vˆ for some fixed vˆ > 0. In Devanur et al. [11] it was proved that complement-free valuations
are pointwise Hm-approximated by CH valuations.
When trying to apply a similar technique for the case of PS-d valuations, we face a challenge, namely
that for d ≥ 1 PS-d valuations cannot be pointwise β-approximated by complement-free valuations for
any β. To see this, consider an instance with two items {a, b} and the PS-1 valuation v({a}) = v({b}) = 0
and v({a, b}) = 1. Any complement-free valuation v′ ≤ v will have v′({a}) = v′({b}) = 0 which implies
v′({a, b}) = 0. Therefore, in order to use the technique of pointwise approximation for PS-d valuations one
must go beyond complement-free valuations. To this end we introduce the following class of valuations.
Definition 8 (d-Constraint Homogeneous Valuations) A valuation v is d-constraint homogeneous (d-
CH) if there exists a value vˆ, and disjoint sets of items Q1, . . . , Q`, each of size at most d, so that
v(Qi) = vˆ · |Qi| for every Qi, and the value of every set S ⊆ [m] is the sum of values of contained Qi’s,
i.e.,
v(S) =
∑
Qi⊆S
v(Qi) = vˆ
∑
Qi⊆S
|Qi| = vˆ · |{t : ∃i s.t. t ∈ Qi ⊆ S}|
Note that 1-CH valuations are CH valuations and that d-CH valuations contain single minded bidders
where the interest set of each agent is of size at most d. The remainder of this section is structured
as follows. In Lemma 3.4 we show that when agents have d-CH valuations the single bid auction is a
( 1−e
−d
d , 1)-smooth mechanism. In Lemma 3.5 we show that the class of PS-d valuations is pointwise
(d+ 2) ·H m
d+1
-approximated by (d+ 1)-CH valuations. These two lemmas imply the smoothness result
for PS-d. Finally, Observation 3.37 implies that the same smoothness result carries over to MPS-d.
Observation 3.3 For every valuation class V, the valuation class max(V) is pointwise 1-approximated
by V.
We begin by proving smoothness for agents with d-CH valuations.
Lemma 3.4 The single bid auction is a ((1 − e−d)/d, 1)-smooth mechanism when agents have d-CH
valuations.
7Observation 3.3 appeared previously (e.g. Lucier and Syrgkanis [25], Syrgkanis and Tardos [32]) and its proof is by
definition: for a valuation v ∈ max(V) and a set S ⊆ [m], let v∗ = v` so that ` ∈ arg max`∈L v`(S), then by definition
v(S) = v∗(S) and v(T ) ≥ v∗(T ) For any set T ⊆ [m].
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proof. Fix a valuation profile v of d-CH valuations, and let S∗ = OPT(v) be an optimal allocation
w.r.t. v. Fix an agent i, let vˆ and {Q`}` be the parameters in agent i’s valuation, and for presentation
clarity write v = vi; v(S) = vˆ ·
∑
Q`⊆S |Q`|. Consider a bid profile b and denote by pj(b) the induced
price for item j, i.e., pj(b) = bi∗ so that i
∗ is the agent that purchases j under bid profile b. Consider
an arbitrary set Q` ⊆ S∗i . Agent i can acquire all items in Q` by bidding t > maxj∈Q` pj(b). In such a
case the utility from purchasing Q` is v(Q`)− t · |Q`| = vˆ · |Q`| − t · |Q`| = |Q`| · (vˆ − t) Therefore:
ui(t,b−i) ≥
∑
Q`⊆S∗i
|Q`| · (vˆ − t) · 1{t > max
j∈Q`
pj(b)}
Suppose i performs the randomized deviation a∗i (vi) with the density function f(t) =
1
d · 1vˆ−t and support
[0, (1− e−d) · vˆ], Then:
E
t∼a∗i (vi)
[ui(t,b−i)] ≥
∑
Q`⊆S∗i
|Q`| ·
∫ (1−e−d)vˆ
maxj∈Q`{pj(b)}
(vˆ − t) · f(t)dt
= 1d ·
∑
Q`⊆S∗i
|Q`| ·
(
(1− e−d)vˆ −max
j∈Q`
{pj(b)}
)
By maxj∈Q`{pj(b)} ≤
∑
j∈Q` pj(b) and v(Q`) = vˆ · |Q`| and |Q`| ≤ d we get that:
E
t∼a∗i (vi)
[ui(t,b−i)] ≥ 1−e−dd ·
∑
Q`⊆S∗i
v(Q`)−
∑
Q`⊆S∗i
∑
j∈Q`
pj(b)
Finally, the first sum is exactly agent i’s valuations for S∗i , and the second sum is at most
∑
j∈S∗i pj(b)
since {Q`}` is a partition, therefore:
E
t∼a∗i (vi)
[ui(t,b−i)] ≥ 1−e−dd · v(S∗i )−
∑
j∈S∗i
pj(b)
Summing over all agents establishes the smoothness property.

Note that the class of single-minded bidders with interest sets of size at most d is a special case of d-CH
valuations, so Lemma 3.4 implies a corresponding bound on the PoA of SBA with respect to single-minded
valuations as well.
Next we show that the class PS-d can be pointwise (d + 2) · H m
d+1
-approximated by (d + 1)-CH
valuations8. In the proof, we use the following two properties of PS-d valuations: First, two items are
in the super-dependency set of each other if and only if they share a hyperedge with a positive weight.
Second, the size of the super-dependency set of an item is bounded by the level of the hierarchy. We note
that neither the class SM-d nor the class PH-k (for k ≥ 2) exhibit both properties.
Lemma 3.5 The PS-d valuation class is pointwise (d+2)·H m
d+1
-approximated by the (d+1)-CH valuation
class.
proof. Consider a valuation v ∈ PS-d, a set X ⊆ [m] and some β to be determined later. Let w be
the hypergraph representation of v, i.e., v(S) =
∑
T⊆S wT . Consider the following greedy construction
of a partition Q = {Q`}` of the set X: While there are more than d + 1 items, select a subset of yet
unselected d+ 1 items from X, with maximum value (with respect to v). The remaining items form the
last subset of the partition. The formal description of the greedy process is given in Algorithm 1.
8Our proof method is in the spirit of the proof that subadditive valuations are pointwise Hm-approximated by CH
valuations, as appears in Devanur et al. [11]
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ALGORITHM 1: Algorithm 1: Partitioning of set X.
Input: A set X ⊆ [m], access to a valuation function v.
Output: A partition Q = {Q`}` of X
1 S ← X.
2 for each ` from 1 to d m
d+1
e do
3 Select a set Q` in arg max A⊆S
|A|=d+1
{v(A)}, or Q` := S if |S| < d + 1.
4 S ← S \Q`. If S = ∅ then terminate.
5 end
Let hQ be the function:
hQ(T ) =
v(X)
|⋃lQ`|β ·
∑
Q`⊆T
|Q`|
Note that for any family of disjoint subsets Q′ each of size at most d+ 1, hQ′ is a (d+ 1)-CH valuation.
It suffices to find some Q′ ⊆ Q so that β · hQ′(X) ≥ v(X) and also hQ′(T ) ≤ v(T ) for all T ⊆ [m]. We
will examine a sequence of such functions hQ′ , so that if none of them pointwise β-approximates v at X,
then this implies an upper bound on β.
Initially consider S1 = X. Since Q is a partition of S1 we have that hQ(X) = v(X)|X|β ·
∑
` |Q`| = v(X)β ,
so the first requirement of pointwise β-approximation holds. If hQ(T ) ≤ v(T ) for all T ⊆ [m] then hQ
pointwise approximates v at |X|. Otherwise, there exists some T1 so that hQ(T1) > v(T1). Since v is
monotone v (∪Q`⊆T1Q`) ≤ v(T1) < hQ(T1) = hQ (∪Q`⊆T1Q`) therefore we may assume w.l.o.g. that T1
is a union of sets from Q. Iteratively, consider Si = Si−1 \ Ti−1. Since Ti−1 and Si−1 are each a union of
sets from Q, then Si is also a union of sets from Q, and QSi = {Q` ∈ Q : Q` ⊆ Si} is a partition of Si.
By definition, hQSi (T ) =
v(X)
|Si|β
∑
Q`∈QSi :Q`⊆T |Q`| is a (d+ 1)-CH valuation, and since QSi is a partition
of Si we get that hQSi (X) =
v(X)
β . If for some i it holds that hQSi (T ) ≤ v(T ) for all T ⊆ [m], then hQSi
pointwise β-approximates v at X. Otherwise, at some point the iterative process terminates and we are
left with two partitions of the set X: {Q`}` and {Ti}i, so that every Q` is a subset of some Tj . Therefore:∑
`
v(Q`) ≤
∑
i
v(Ti) <
∑
i
hQSi (Ti) =
v(X)
β
∑
i
|Ti|
|Si| (2)
where the first inequality is because v has a positive-hypergraph representation, the second inequality is
by construction, and the last equality is because every Si and Ti are unions of subsets from Q. Denote
by C(Q) the collection of all hyperedges e ⊆ X with we > 0 so that e 6⊆ Q` for all `. By construction it
holds that v(X) =
∑
` v(Q`) +
∑
e∈C(Q) we. The first sum in the last expression is the total weight of all
(hyper)edges that are in the interior of some partition element Q`. The second is the total weight of all
edges that connect at least two partition elements. We establish the following lemma:
Lemma 3.6
∑
e∈C(Q) we ≤ (d+ 1)
∑
` v(Q`)
Before proving Lemma 3.6 we show how it is used to conclude the proof. Note that the proof of
Lemma 3.6 relies on the properties of the class PS-d. Lemma 3.6 implies v(X) ≤ (d + 2)∑` v(Q`). By
equation (2) we get: v(X) < (d + 2)v(X)β
∑ |Ti|
|Si| therefore β < (d + 2)
∑ |Ti|
|Si| . For ease of exposition
assume |X| is divisible by (d+ 1), which implies that the cardinality of every Q`, and hence every Si and
every Ti are divisible by d+ 1. Let si =
|Si|
d+1 and ti =
|Ti|
d+1 . Therefore:
∑
i
|Ti|
|Si| =
∑
i
ti
si
=
∑
i
ti−1∑
j=0
1
si
≤
∑
i
ti−1∑
j=0
1
si−j =
s1−1∑
j=0
1
s1−j = Hs1 = H |X|
d+1
(3)
Which concludes that β < (d+ 2) ·H m
d+1
. It remains to prove Lemma 3.6.
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proof. For each Q`, we show there exists a set E` ⊆ C(Q), such that the collection {E`}` satisfies
C(Q) ⊆ ∪`E`, and for every ` it holds that:∑
e∈E`
we ≤ (d+ 1)v(Q`) (4)
We conclude that
∑
e∈C(Q) we ≤
∑
`
∑
e∈E` we ≤ (d+ 1)
∑
` v(Q`), where the first inequality is true since
C(Q) ⊆ ∪`E`. Let E` denote the set of hyperedges e ∈ C(Q) such that ` is the minimal index of a
set from the partition Q for which e ∩ Q` 6= ∅. For every item j ∈ Q` define Ej` = {e ∈ E` : j ∈ e},
i.e., the hyperedges in E` in which j is a member, clearly E` =
⋃
j∈Q` E
j
` . For a set of hyperedges
E, let V (E) =
⋃
e∈E e. By Lemma 2.4 we get that V (E
j
` ) ⊆
(
Dep+(j) ∪ {j})9, which implies that∣∣∣V (Ej` )∣∣∣ ≤ |Dep+(j)|+ 1 ≤ (d+ 1), where the last inequality follows from PS-d ⊆ SM-d. By definition of
E`, for every j
′ ∈ V (E`), if j′ ∈ Q`′ , then `′ ≥ `, which implies that prior to the `th iteration of step 3 in
Algorithm 1, all the items in V (E`) are available, i.e., in the set S. Therefore, for every item j ∈ Q` the
set V (Ej` ) was available. By step 3 and monotonicity of v, Q` maximizes value over all available sets of
size at most d+ 1 therefore v(Q`) ≥ v(V (Ej` )) for every j. Therefore:∑
e∈E`
we ≤
∑
j∈Q`
∑
e∈Ej`
we ≤
∑
j∈Q`
v
(
V (Ej` )
)
≤ |Q`| v(Q`) ≤ (d+ 1)v(Q`)


3.1 Improved PoA when hyperedges are of size at most 2
In the following subsection we show that PH-2∩SM-d valuations are pointwise (d+1)Hm/2-approximated
by 2-CH valuations, which by Lemma 3.4 and observation 3.3 implies that the PoA is at most
2(d+1)Hm/2
1−e−2
when agents have valuations in max(PH-2 ∩ SM-d):
Theorem 3.7 The single bid auction is a ( 1−e
−2
2(d+1)Hm/2
, 1)-smooth mechanism for max(PH-2 ∩ SM-d)
valuations. Thus, it has a price of anarchy of at most O(d log(m)).
This shows an improvement of roughly a factor of d when compared to MPS-d valuations. The main
difference when comparing to the proof of Theorem 3.1 is that we show that max(PH-2∩SM-d) valuations
are (d+ 1)Hm/2-pointwise approximated by 2-CH valuations (as opposed to (d+ 1)-CH valuations).
Lemma 3.8 The class PH-2 ∩ SM-d is pointwise (d+ 1)Hm/2-approximated by 2-CH valuations
proof. Let v ∈ PH-2 ∩ SM-d be a valuation function, and let X be a set of items. W.l.o.g. assume
X = [m], and both terms will be used interchangeably during the proof. Let G = (V,E) be its graphical
representation with weights we ≥ 0 for edges e ∈ E and wz for vertices z ∈ V . According to Vizing’s
theorem[33] the chromatic index of every graph with maximal vertex-degree d is either d or d+1. Therefore
there is a coloring of the edges C = {Ci}i with |C| ≤ d + 1. Denote w(Ci) =
∑
e∈Ci we - the sum of the
weights of all edges in Ci. Let imax be the ”heaviest” color, i.e. the color with the property:
imax = arg max
i
w(Ci)
The heaviest color is at least as heavy as the average:
w(Cimax) ≥
1
|C|
∑
i
w(Ci) ≥ 1
d+ 1
∑
i
w(Ci) (5)
9If j′ ∈ V (Ej` ) then there exists an edge e 3 j, j′ so that we > 0. By Lemma 2.4 either j′ = j or j′ ∈ Dep+(j).
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And so:
(d+ 1)
∑
e∈Cimax
we = (d+ 1)w(Cimax) ≥
∑
i
w(Ci) =
∑
e∈E
we (6)
As a color, Cimax is a set of edges without common vertices, and can be seen as partition to disjoint
pairs of some subset of V . Let Q be the partition of [m] that we get by pairing all vertices not in⋃
e∈Cimax e in some way, and adding it to Cimax . Q now satisfies:∑
`
v(Q`) ≥ [
∑
z∈V
wz + w(Cimax)] ≥
∑
z∈V
wz +
1
d+ 1
∑
e∈E
we
≥ 1
d+ 1
[sumz∈V wz +
∑
e∈E
we] =
v([m])
d+ 1
(7)
Given a partition Q, let hQ be the function:
hQ(X) =
v(X)
|X|β
∑
`
|Q`| = v(X)
β
Like in the proof of Lemma 3.5, we iteratively define a sequence of sets Si in the following way. Let
S1 = X. if there exists a set T1 which satisfies v(T1) < hQ(T1), assume w.l.o.g that T1 is a union of sets
from Q and define for every i > 1, Si = Si−1\Ti−1. Because Ti is a union of elements from Q, so is Si, and
so Q induces a partition QSi on Si and a d + 1-CH function hQSi (T ) =
v(X)
|Si|β
∑
Q`∈QSi :Q`⊆T |Q`|. If for
some i it holds that hQSi (T ) ≤ v(T ) for all T , then hQSi (T ) pointwise β-approximates v. Otherwise, the
iterative process terminates at some imax because |Si| decreases every iteration. If the process terminates
and none of the functions hQSi β-approximates v at X, then we have two partitions of the set X: {Q`}`
and {Ti}i, so that every Q` is a subset of some Tj . Therefore:
v(X)
d+ 1
≤
∑
`
v(Q`) ≤
∑
i
v(Ti) <
∑
hQSi (Ti) =
v(X)
β
∑ |Ti|
|Si| (8)
Where the first inequality is (7), the second is by super-modularity of the class PH-2, and third inequality
is by construction. Rearranging terms yields:
β < (d+ 1)
∑ |Ti|
|Si|
Using equation (3) from the proof of lemma 3.5, we get:
β < (d+ 1)
∑ |Ti|
|Si| ≤ (d+ 1)
m
2∑
k=1
1
k
≤ (d+ 1)Hm/2
So for every β ≥ (d+ 1)Hm/2, there is a 2-CH function that β-approximates v at X.

3.2 Lower bounds
Proposition 3.9 shows a lower bound of d, which holds even for the more restricted class PH-2 ∩ SM-d,
and even with respect to the best equilibrium.
Proposition 3.9 There exists an instance with one bidder with a SM-d∩PH-2 valuation and one bidder
that is interested in a single item, for which the price of stability of the single-bid auction is d −  for
every  > 0.
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proof. Consider an instance as described in the beginning of subsection 2.2, but with d + 1 items.
By adding m− d− 1 items that have no value to any of the agents, the result follows directly.

In [11], a lower bound of Ω( logmlog logm ) has been shown for the price of stability (PoS) of the single-bid
auction with additive valuations. This bound carries over to valuations in PH-2∩SM-d for every d (since
additive valuations are a strict subclass of PH-2 ∩ SM-d). We conclude that the PoS for PH-2 ∩ SM-d
valuations is at least max (d,Ω( logmlog logm )).
We show another example that simultaneously captures the two lower bounds above, i.e., an instance
where agents have PH-2∩SM-d valuations, for which the PoS of the single bid auction is Ω(d+ logmlog logm ).
Proposition 3.10 If all agents have valuations in PH-2∩SM-d, the PoS of the single bid auction w.r.t.
pure Nash equilibria is at least Ω(d+ logmlog logm ).
proof. Let k be some number divisible by d, and let [m] be composed of k bundles-{B0, ..., Bk−1},
where bundle Bt is of size |Bt|= kt. Let there be 4k + 1 bidders. The first bidder (which we refer to
as the “strong” bidder), has a valuation w (which is PH-2 ∩ SM-(d− 1)) as follows: The items in each
bundle Bt are divided to subsets of size d, and each of these groups is a d-star-graph in w’s hypergraph
representation, with edge weight of dd−1k
k−t. In total, ∀t, w(Bt) = kk, and w([m]) = kk+1. The next
2k bidders, with valuations marked x0, x
′
0, ..., xk−1, x
′
k−1 are as follows. First, denote λ =
d
d+k . For each
t = 0, ..., (k − 1), xt is additive, is only interested in (1 − λ) = kd+k of the stars inside Bt, and only in
the center of each star. For each center j of any of these stars, xt(j) = k
k−t−1. For all other items j,
xt(j) = 0. In addition x
′
t = xt. Note that the maximal value that bidder xt can get (by winning all of
her desired items) is xt([m]) = xt(Bt) =
1
d (1 − λ)kk−1. The final 2k bidders, with valuations marked
v0, v
′
0..., vk−1, v
′
k−1 are as follows: for each t = 0, ..., (k−1), vt is additive, is only interested in λ = dd+k of
the stars inside Bt (the stars that xt is not interested in), and only in the center of each star. For these
special items, vt = k
k−t + . For all other items, vt = 0. in addition v′t = vt. Note that if bidder vt wins
all of her desired items the maximum value she can get is vt([m]) = vt(Bt) =
1
dλk
k + 1dλk
t.
The optimal allocation gives all items to the strong bidder and yields a social welfare of kk+1. Due to
best-response dynamics, in an equilibrium, every bidder vt, v
′
t will bid exactly k
k−t +  and every bidder
xt, x
′
t will bid exactly k
k−t−1. The special bidder will bid some number b. Whatever the value of b is, she
will win no more than two bundles, and no more than a fraction of (1 − λ) = kd+k out of each of those
two bundles. Assuming, w.l.o.g, that bidders vt and xt win every tie breaking, each of them wins all of
her desired items. The social welfare will be:
SW(EQ) ≤ 2(1− λ)kk + k · 1
d
λkk +
1
d
(1− λ)kk−1 = 2 k
d+ k
kk+
1
d
d
d+ k
kk+1 +
1
d(d+ k)
kk = O(
1
d+ k
kk+1)
This yields PoS = SW(OPT )SW(EQ) = Ω(d+ k) = Ω(d+
logm
log logm )

4 Hybrid Single Bid Mechanisms
In this section we give a bound on the price of anarchy for general valuations by randomizing between
the single bid auction and the grand bundle auction, described as follows.
The Grand bundle auction The grand-bundle auction solicits a single bid bi ∈ R+ from each agent
i, approaches the agents in decreasing order of their bids, and offers each agent i the grand bundle [m]
for the price bi, once an agent acquires [m] the auction ends. Since the grand bundle auction solicits a
single real-valued bid from each bidder, then runs a truthful mechanism, it is also an ALI mechanism.
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We show that randomizing between the single bid auction and the grand bundle auction (by soliciting
independent bids for the two auctions) gives price of anarchy of at most O (
√
m) for general valuations
(Theorem 4.2).
Our proof proceeds as follows. We partition the space of valuation profiles into two disjoint subspaces,
depending on whether there exists an optimal allocation where a single agent contributes at least 1√
m
of OPT, or not. For the first subspace, we show that the grand bundle auction is ( 1
2
√
m
(1 − e−1), 1)-
smooth; for the second subspace we show that the single bid auction is ( 1
2
√
m
· (1 − e−
√
m), 1)-smooth.
This immediately implies that running both auctions independently and taking the better equilibrium
gives price of anarchy of at most O(
√
m). However, a priori, it is not clear which auction to run. A naive
approach would be to run both auctions simultaneously with independent bids, and apply the outcome
of the better mechanism. As previously observed by [24], such an approach fails badly, as demonstrated
by the following example:
Example Consider m = n ≥ 2 agents. Each agent i has value 1 for a unique item ai, and a value of
1+  for the grand bundle [m]. If each agent submits a bid of 0 to the single-bid auction and a bid of 1+ 
to the grand bundle auction, the social welfare achieved by the grand bundle auction is 1 +  by handing
[m] so some agent. This is a pure Nash equilibrium since no bidder can achieve non-negative utility in the
grand bundle auction by deviating, and any unilateral deviation in the single bid auction that achieves
non-negative utility for an agent, induces an outcome with social welfare at most 1, therefore the grand
bundle auction will still be selected. Clearly the optimal allocation hands each agent i its respective item
of interest ai, resulting in social welfare of m. This shows a price of anarchy of m−  for every  > 0.
In [24] it is shown that the problem can be circumvented by introducing randomization. In this section
we formalize this idea by using the smoothness framework.
Definition 9 (Hybrid mechanism) Given two mechanisms M and M′, and a real number 0 < p < 1,
the hybrid mechanism (M,M′, p) solicits from each agent i two actions, ai, a′i, and runs M(a) with
probability p and M′(a′) with probability 1− p.
It follows by definition that a hybrid mechanism that is composed of two ALI mechanisms is also an
ALI mechanism.
The following lemma establishes the smoothness of a hybrid mechanism.
Lemma 4.1 Let V and V ′ be spaces of valuation profiles. Suppose mechanism M is (λ, µ)-smooth w.r.t.
valuation profiles in V, and mechanism M′ is (λ′, µ′)-smooth w.r.t. valuation profiles in V ′. Then, for
every p, the hybrid mechanism (M,M′, p) is (p · λ,max{µ, 1})-smooth w.r.t. valuation profiles in V and
((1− p) · λ′,max{µ′, 1})-smooth w.r.t. valuation profiles in V ′.
proof. Consider a valuation profile v ∈ V. Consider an arbitrary action profile (a,a′), where a =
(a1, . . . , an) and a
′ = (a′1, . . . , a
′
n). Let Pi and P
′
i denote the payments of mechanisms M and M′
respectively, and similarly for utilities and values. Utilities (upi ), values (v
p
i ), and payments (P
p
i ), denote
the expected value of those quantities for agent i in the hybrid mechanism (M,M′, p) (e.g. for payments,
P pi (a,a
′) = p ·Pi(a) + (1− p) ·P ′i (a′)). Let a∗i (v) be the deviation given by the smoothness of mechanism
M. For ease of exposition denote a∗i (v) by a∗i and assume that a∗i is a pure strategy. By considering the
utility of each agent i at the action profile ((a∗i ,a−i),a
′) and then using the linearity of expectation:∑
i
upi ((a
∗
i ,a−i),a
′) =
∑
i
p · ui(a∗i ,a−i) + (1− p)u′i(a′) = p
∑
i
ui(a
∗
i ,a−i) + (1− p)
∑
i
u′i(a
′)
By smoothness of M it holds that:
∑
i
upi ((a
∗
i ,a−i),a
′) ≥ p ·
(
λ · SW(OPT (v))− µ ·
∑
i
Pi(a)
)
+ (1− p) ·
∑
i
u′i(a
′)
= p · λ · SW(OPT (v))− µ · p ·
∑
i
Pi(a) + (1− p) ·
∑
i
(v′i(a
′)− P ′i (a′))
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By v′i(a
′) ≥ 0 we get:
∑
i
upi ((a
∗
i ,a−i),a
′) ≥ p · λ · SW(OPT (v))−max{µ, 1}
∑
i
(p · Pi(a) + (1− p) · P ′i (a′))
= p · λ · SW(OPT (v))−max{µ, 1}
∑
i
P pi (a,a
′),
where the last equality follows by the definition of the hybrid mechanism. Symmetrically, for every
valuation profile v′ ∈ V ′ the mechanism is ((1− p) · λ′,max{µ′, 1})-smooth with respect to valuations in
V ′.

We now establish our main theorem. While each of the grand bundle and single bid auctions has a
price of anarchy of Ω(m) for general valuations, the hybrid mechanism gives price of anarchy of at most
O(
√
m).
Theorem 4.2 The hybrid mechanism composed of the single-bid and the grand-bundle auctions with
p = 1/2 is ( 1
4
√
m
(1− e−1), 1)-smooth for general valuations.
We first consider valuation profiles in which the optimal welfare can be approximated by allocating
the grand bundle.
Lemma 4.3 If for a class of valuation profiles V, for every v ∈ V there exists an agent i∗ so that
vi∗([m]) ≥ β · SW(OPT (v)), then the grand-bundle auction is a (β · (1− e−1), 1)-smooth mechanism.
proof. Consider a valuation profile v, and assume there exists an agent i∗ so that vi∗([m]) ≥ β ·
SW(OPT (v)). Consider an arbitrary bid profile b = (b1, . . . , bn), and let b
′(b) be the winning bid in b.
If agent i∗ deviates to a deterministic bid t ≤ vi∗([m]), then i∗ can acquire the grand bundle for sure only
if t > b′(b). Therefore:
ui∗(t,b−i∗) ≥ (vi∗([m])− t) · 1{t > b′(b)}
Note that
∑
i∈N Pi(b) = b
′(b). Consider the randomized deviation B′i∗ distributed by the density
function:
f(t) =
1
vi∗([m])− t
on the support
[
0, (1− e−1)vi∗([m])
]
. Then:
E [ui∗(B′i∗ ,b−i∗)] ≥
∫ (1−e−1)vi∗ ([m])
b′(b)
(vi∗([m])− t) f(t)dt
=
∫ (1−e−1)vi∗ ([m])
b′(b)
1 · dt
=(1− e−1)vi∗([m])− b′(b)
≥β · (1− e−1) · SW(OPT (v))−
∑
i∈N
Pi(b)
Since all other agents can acquire a non-negative utility, we conclude.

We now consider valuation profiles in which the optimal welfare can be well-approximated by “small”
allocations.
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Lemma 4.4 If for every valuation profile v in a class of valuation profiles V there exists an allocation
S∗ so that SW(S∗) ≥ β · SW(OPT (v)) and |S∗i | ≤ γ for every agent i, then for every c > 0 the single bid
auction is (c · (1− e−1/c)β, c · γ)-smooth w.r.t. V.
proof. Consider a valuation profile v and let S∗ be an allocation that β-approximates the optimal
allocation OPT (v). Consider an arbitrary bid profile b = (b1, . . . , bn). Denote by pj(b) the price of item
j under bid profile b. If agent i deviates to a deterministic bid t <
vi(S
∗
i )
|S∗i | , she can acquire the set S
∗
i only
if t > maxj∈S∗i pj(b). Therefore:
ui(t,b−i) ≥ (vi(S∗i )− t · |S∗i | ) · 1{t > max
j∈S∗i
pj(b)}
Given v, and a bundle of items B, let Di(B) be i’s average value-per-item of the bundle B, i.e.,
Di(B) =
vi(B)
|B|
Furthermore, for ease of notation let D∗i = Di(S
∗
i ). Consider the randomized deviation B
′
i distributed
by the density function:
f(t) = c · 1
D∗i − t
on the support
[
0, c · (1− e−1/c)D∗i
]
. Then:
E [ui(B′i,b−i)] ≥
∫ c·(1−e−1/c)D∗i
maxj∈S∗
i
pj(b)
(vi(S
∗
i )− t · |S∗i |) f(t)dt
=c ·
∫ c·(1−e−1/c)D∗i
maxj∈S∗
i
pj(b)
vi(S
∗
i )− t · |S∗i |
D∗i − t
dt
=c ·
∫ c·(1−e−1/c)D∗i
maxj∈S∗
i
pj(b)
|S∗i | (D∗i − t)
D∗i − t
dt
=c · (1− e−1/c)vi(S∗i )− c ·max
j∈S∗i
pj(b) · |S∗i |
Summing over all agents we get:∑
i
E [ui(B′i,b−i)] ≥ c · (1− e−1/c)SW(S∗)− c ·
∑
i
max
j∈S∗i
pj(b) · |S∗i | (9)
≥ c · (1− e−1/c)SW(S∗)− c ·
∑
i
|S∗i |
∑
j∈S∗i
pj(b) (10)
For every i it holds that |S∗i | ≤ γ therefore:∑
i
E [ui(B′i,b−i)] ≥c · (1− e−1/c)SW(S∗)− c · γ
∑
i
∑
j∈S∗i
pj(b)
≥c · (1− e−1/c)β · SW(OPT(v))− c · γ
∑
j
pj(b)
As required.

The above lemmas lead to the following definition.
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Definition 10 A valuation profile v is z-lopsided if there exists an optimal allocation S∗ so that at
least half of the social welfare is due to agents that were allocated a bundle with at least z goods, i.e.,
if
∑
i∈A vi(S
∗
i ) ≥ 12SW(S∗), where A ⊆ N and for every i ∈ A it holds that |S∗i | ≥ z. We denote by
LOP (z) the class of all z-lopsided valuation profiles.
The following lemma is implied by Lemma 4.3.
Lemma 4.5 The grand-bundle auction is a ( z2m ·(1−e−1), 1)-smooth mechanism with respect to valuation
profiles in LOP (z).
proof. Fix a valuation profile v ∈ LOP (z). There exists an allocation S∗ and a set of agents A ⊆ N
so that SW(S∗) = SW(OPT(v)) and for every i ∈ A it holds that |S∗i | ≥ z, and that
∑
i∈A vi(S
∗
i ) ≥
1
2SW(S
∗). Since |A| · z ≤ m it must be that |A| ≤ mz . Therefore, there must exist an agent i∗ ∈ A so
that vi∗(S
∗
i∗) ≥ 1|A|
∑
i∈A vi(S
∗
i ) ≥ z2mSW(S∗). The assertion of the lemma is established by applying
lemma 4.3.

Similarly, the following lemma is implied by Lemma 4.4.
Lemma 4.6 For every c > 0, the single-bid auction is a ( c2 · (1 − e−1/c), c · z)-smooth mechanism with
respect to valuation profiles v 6∈ LOP (z).
proof. Fix a valuation profile v 6∈ LOP (z). Consider an optimal allocation S∗. Consider the set of
agents A = {i ∈ N : |S∗i | < z}. Since v 6∈ LOP (z) it must be that
∑
i∈A vi(S
∗
i ) >
1
2SW(S
∗), otherwise
the set of agents N \ A would imply that v ∈ LOP (z). Therefore, by lemma 4.4, for every c > 0 the
single bid auction is ( c2 · (1− e−1/c), c · z)-smooth with respect to valuation profiles not in LOP (z).

To conclude the proof of Theorem 4.2, note that Lemma 4.5 implies that the grand-bundle auction is
( 1
2
√
m
(1− e−1), 1)-smooth w.r.t. valuation profiles in LOP (√m) , and Lemma 4.6, with c = 1√
m
, implies
that the single-bid auction is ( 1
2
√
m
· (1− e−
√
m), 1)-smooth w.r.t. valuations not in LOP (
√
m). It follows
by Lemma 4.1 that the hybrid mechanism is ( 1
4
√
m
(1− e−1), 1)-smooth, as desired.
4.1 Lower bounds
This guarantee is tight up to a constant of 14 (1− e−1). we show a lower bound of
√
m for the PoA of the
hybrid mechanism in every PNE.
Proposition 4.7 There exists a valuation profile v for which the PoA of the Hyb mechanism with regard
to pure Nash equilibria is at least
√
m .
proof. For some k, Consider 2k bidders with valuation functions vt, xt for t = 1, ..., k and items
1, 2, . . . , k2 = m. In a slight abuse of notation we will say “bidder vt” and mean “the bidder with valuation
vt”. Divide [m] into k bundles of size k each - B1, ..., Bk with Bt = {(t − 1) · k + j : j = 1, . . . , k}. For
every t = 1, ..., k, vt ∈ PH-2 ∩ SM-(k − 1), has a star shaped valuation where the vertex set of the star
is Bt, the center is item (t − 1)k + 1, and the weight of each edge is 1. Also, for very t, bidder xt is
interested only in the item (t − 1)k + 1 with a value of k−1k + . Let b denote a PNE of SBA and b′ a
PNE of GB auction. The profile (b,b′) is a pure Nash equilibrium of Hyb. Clearly the optimal allocation
gives each bundle Bt to bidder vt, yielding a social welfare of k(k − 1). By the same argument that is
used to show Observation 2.3, if the SB mechanism is played than bidders vt win nothing and bidders
xt win all star centers (items of the form (t− 1)k + 1 for t = 1, 2 . . . , k) and get a total social welfare of
k(k−1k + ) = k − 1 + k. The total value of each bidder for the grand bundle [m] is at most k − 1 so the
GB auction cannot achieve a social welfare of more than k − 1. We get that if Hyb is played, regardless
of which of the two mechanisms (SB or GB) is actually played, the obtained social welfare is no more
than k − 1 + k, which is arbitrarily close to 1k = 1√m of the optimal.

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5 Discussion
In this paper we study simple mechanisms for settings that exhibit complementarities. We focus on the
single bid auction, which has been shown to have a logarithmic PoA for complement free valuations. We
show upper and lower bounds on the PoA when agents have complementarities, captured by the MPS-d
hierarchy. We also show that randomizing between the single bid auction and the grand bundle auction
gives PoA of O(
√
m) for general valuations. Our results leave a gap between the lower and upper bounds
on the PoA of the single bid auction when applied to MPS-d valuations. In the full version we show that
our upper bound is essentially tight with respect to our proof technique. In particular, we show that the
pointwise approximation of MPS-d by (d + 1)-CH valuations is tight (up to a logm factor). A major
open problem is to find the price of anarchy of the single bid auction for SM-d valuations.
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A Limitations on the pointwise approximation method for PS-d
In this section we discuss the limitations of the pointwise approximation method for valuations in PS-d.
It remains an interesting open question - what is the real approximation ratio between (d + 1)-CH and
PS-d, and how does it depend on the number of items m? We show progress in answering this question
by proving various lower bounds for the approximation ratio of PS-d by the classes k-CH for all k ≤ d+1.
The following proposition shows that using k-CH valuations where k < d+ 1 cannot improve our results.
Proposition A.1 For all d, and all k < d+ 1, there exists a valuation v ∈ PS-d such that if v′ ∈ k-CH
pointwise β-approximates v at [m], then β ≥ ( dk−1).
proof. We show that there exists a valuation v ∈ PS-d such that for all v′ ∈ k-CH, it holds that
v([m])
v′([m]) ≥
(
d
k−1
)
. Set m = d+ 1 and consider the valuation v ∈ PS-d with the hypergraph representation
that contains all of the possible hyper-edges of size k, and gives each hyper-edge a weight of 1. There are(
d+1
k
)
such hyper-edges and therefore v([m]) ≤ (d+1k ). Assume v′ ∈ k-CH and that v′ β-approximates v
at [m]. Because v′ ∈ k-CH, all edges that are assigned positive weight by v′ must be disjoint. Therefore
v′ cannot assign positive weight to more than d+1k hyper edges of size k. Furthermore, by the definition
of β-approximation, for every T ⊆ [m] it holds that v′(T ) ≤ v(T ). Specifically for all hyper edges e
with |e| < k, v′(e) ≤ v(e) = 0, and for all hyper edges e with |e| = k, v′(e) ≤ v(e) = 1. Therefore,
v′([m]) ≤ d+1k . In total we get:
β ≥ v([m])
v′([m])
≥ k
d+ 1
(
d+ 1
k
)
=
(
d
k − 1
)
(11)

Next, we show two lower bounds on the approximation ratio of PS-d by the class (d + 1)-CH. The
following is from [9].
Theorem A.2 For d = 2, 3, 5, 7 and d ≥ 10, there exist d-regular graphs, for which the shortest cycle is
of length larger than logd(m/4).
Proposition A.3 For d = 2, 3, 5, 7 and d ≥ 10, there exists a large enough m and a valuation v ∈ PS-d,
such that if v′ ∈ (d+ 1)-CH and v′ pointwise β-approximates v at [m] then β ≥ d.
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proof. Consider the valuation v with the hypergraph representation given by having a weight 1 on each
edge from the graph given by theorem A.2. Since the graph is d regular, there are d ·m edges, therefore
v([m]) = d ·m. For large enough m, the shortest cycle in the graph is larger than d+ 1, therefore in any
set of at most k ≤ d+1 nodes, there will be at most k−1 edges connecting two nodes from the set. Let v′
be a (d+ 1)-CH valuation that β-approximates v. By definition of pointwise β-approximation, for every
item j it holds that v′({j}) ≤ v({j}) = 0 for every edge e it holds that v′(e) ≤ v(e) = 1. Let Q1, . . . Q`
be the sets that form the valuation v′. For any of the sets Qi, it must hold that v′(Qi) ≤ |Qi| therefore
v′([m]) ≤ m. As a result v([m])v′([m]) ≥ d which implies β ≥ d. 
Note that the requirement logd(m/4) ≥ d + 1 translates to m = Ω(dd). The next result is a slightly
less tight lower bound, but for a more general case.
Proposition A.4 For large enough d, and m ≥ d2, there exists a valuation v ∈ PS-d, such that if
v′ ∈ (d+ 1)-CH and v′ pointwise β-approximates v at [m] then β = Ω( dlog d ).
For the proof of proposition A.4, we will use random graphs to show there exists a valuation f ∈ PS-d
such that for every g ∈ (d + 1)-CH, f([m])g([m]) ≥ C · dlog d for some constant C. Let G = (V,E) be a graph,
and denote e(S) = |{e = ij ∈ E such that i, j ∈ S}| (the number of edges in G with both endpoints in
S). For the proof of proposition A.4 we use the following lemma:
Lemma A.5 For large enough d, there exists a graph G = (V,E) on m = d2 vertices which satisfies:
1. Every vertex set S ⊆ V with |S| = k ≤ d+ 1 satisfies e(S) ≤ 12k log d.
2. The maximal vertex degree ∆(G) satisfies ∆(G) ≤ d
3. |E| ≥ 19d3
Using the graph G from lemma A.5 we prove proposition A.4:
proof. [of proposition A.4 ] Assume that d is large enough for G = (V,E) from lemma A.5 to exist,
and assume d ≤ √m. Let f be a graphical valuation on [m], constructed in the following way: divide [m]
into T = md2 bundles of size d
2 each = B1, B2, ..., BT . For each Bt, fix some bijection pit : Bt → V and let
the edges in Bt correspond to edges in G as induced by pit. Let each edge in Bt have a weight of 1, and
each vertex - a weight of 0. Thus, for all t, f(Bt) = Ω(d
3) and f([m]) = Ω(d3 md2 ) = Ω(m · d), furthermore
- f ∈ PS-d.
Now, consider any d + 1-CH valuation function g on [m]. Denote Qg = {Qgi }i∈I(g) the supporting
item sets for g. By definition |Qgi | ≤ d + 1 for all i ∈ I(g). Assume that g satisfies g(S) ≤ f(S) for all
S ⊆ [m]. To finish it is enough to prove that g([m]) = O(m log d). g ≤ f , and by the construction of f
we get that for any item set Qgi :
vˆg · |Qgi | = g(Qgi ) ≤ f(Qgi ) = 1 · e(Qgi )
=
∑
t
e(Bt ∩Qgi ) ≤
∑
t
12 |Bt ∩Qgi | · log d = 12 |Qgi | · log d
We get that vˆg ≤ 12 log d. So for g([m]) we get:
g([m]) = vˆg ·
∑
i∈I(g)
|Qgi | ≤ vˆg ·m ≤ 12 ·m log d
as required. 
We now turn to prove lemma A.5.
proof. [Of Lemma A.5] Consider a random graph G(m, p) with m = d2 vertices and p = 12d the
independent probability for the existence of each edge. We will show that for large enough d, with
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positive probability G(m, p) satisfies all three requirement simultaneously and therefore such a graph
must exist. For this it is enough to show that each of the requirements by itself is fulfilled with high
probability (abbreviated w.h.p.), i.e. the probability that the requirement is fulfilled tends to 1 as d
increases.
1. For S with |S| = k ≤ log d the claim is trivial, there are at most 12k2 edges in S, and if k ≤ log d
then 12k
2 ≤ k log d. For k > log d, the number of edges in any set S of size k ≤ d+ 1 is a binomial
random variable XS = Bin(
(
k
2
)
, 12d ). Its expectation:
µ = E[XS ] =
(
k
2
)
1
2d
=
k(k − 1)
4d
Using a Chernoff bound we get (for  > 1):
Pr{XS ≥ (1 + )µ} ≤ exp(− 
2
2 + 
µ) ≤ exp(−1
2

k2
4d
) = exp(−k
2
8d
)
There are
(
d2
k
)
vertex subsets of size k. A standard bound for
(
n
k
)
is:(
d2
k
)
≤
(
ed2
k
)k
Let  = C dk log(
d2
k ) for some C large enough to be determined later. Note that:
(1 + )µ = [1 + C
d
k
log(
d2
k
)]
k(k − 1)
4d
=
1
2
C(k − 1) log d− 1
4
C(k − 1) log k + k(k − 1)
4d
≤ 1
2
Ck log d
Let YS be the indicator variable that is equal to 1 if XS ≥ 12Ck log d ≥ (1 + )µ and 0 otherwise.
Denote
Yk =
∑
S⊆V,|S|=k
YS
Using the union bound we get:
E[Yk] = E[
∑
S⊆V,|S|=k
YS ] =
∑
S⊆V,|S|=k
E[YS ] =
∑
S⊆V,|S|=k
Pr{YS = 1}
≤ (ed
2
k
)k · e− k
2
8d  ≤ exp(k(log(d
2
k
) + 1)− C
8
k log(
d2
k
))
≤ exp(−(C
8
− 2)k log(d
2
k
)) ≤ exp(−k log(d
2
k
))
For all of the inequalities in the above calculation to hold it’s enough to take C > 24. We see that
the expected number of sets of size k with more than 12k log d edges is vanishingly small. Thus,
Markov’s inequality implies:
Pr{Yk ≥ 1} ≤ E[Yk] ≤ e−k log( d
2
k )
Again using the union bound we get:
Pr{∃1 ≤ k ≤ (d+ 1) : Yk ≥ 1} ≤
d+1∑
k=1
e−k log(
d2
k )
≤ (d+ 1)e−2 log d = d+ 1
d2
so w.h.p every vertex subset S ⊆ V with |S| = k ≤ d+ 1 satisfies e(S) ≤ 12k log d.
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2. The degree deg(x) of each vertex x ∈ V is a binomial random variable B(m− 1, p) = B(d2− 1, 12d ).
Its expectation is E[deg(x)] = d
2−1
2d =
1
2d− 12d . Using Chernoff again:
Pr{deg(x) > d} ≤ e− 16d
Using the union bound again:
Pr{∆(G) > d} ≤
∑
x∈V
Pr{deg(x) > d} ≤ d2e− 16d
so w.h.p. ∆(G) ≤ d.
3. The total number of edges in G is a binomial random variable B(
(
d2
2
)
, 12d ) with expectation E [|E|] =
1
4d
3 − 14d. With Chernoff we get:
Pr{|E| ≤ 1
8
d(d2 − 1)} ≤ e− 132d3+ 132d
so w.h.p. |E| ≥ 18d3 − 18d ≥ 19d3.

Next, we show that our analysis of the greedy algorithm in the proof of lemma 3.5 is almost tight:
Proposition A.6 If d <
√
m, there exists a valuation v ∈ PS-d, for which the partition {Q`}` given by
algorithm 1 satisfies:
v([m]) = d
∑
`
v(Q`)
This shows the analysis of algorithm 1 is almost tight because for the partition that is returned by
the algorithm we show that: v([m]) ≤ (d+ 2)∑` v(Q`).
proof. Let G = (V,E) be a graph with vertices that correspond to items in the auction, i.e. V = [m],
constructed in the following way: divide V to T = b md2+1c bundles of size d2 +1 each - B1, ...BT . Number
all of the items in
⋃
tBt by ordered pairs - (t, j) ∈ {1, ..., T}×{0, 1, ..., d2} such that Bt = {(k, j) : k = t},
i.e. the first coordinate is the bundle number for the item and the second coordinate is the number inside
the bundle. The set of edges E is defined in the following way:
Ecentert =
{
{(t, d2), (t, kd)} : k = 0, ..., (d− 1)
}
Erimt =
{
{(t, kd), (t, kd+ j)} : k = 0, ..., (d− 1), j = 1, ..., (d− 1)
}
E =
⋃
t=1,...,T
Et =
⋃
t=1,...,T
(Ecentert ∪ Erimt )
Note that Et is the set of edges in G with both ends in Bt, and there are no edges e = (x, y) ∈ E
with x ∈ Bt1 and y ∈ Bt2 , i.e. there are no crossing edges between different bundles. The valuation v
is described, as usual, via its graphical representation - it gives a weight of 0 to each individual item, a
weight of 1t to edges e ∈ Ecentert and a weight of 1t −  (for an arbitrary small  > 0) to edges in Erimt .
First note that v ∈ PS-d because all edges have non-negative weight and no item has more than d
neighbors.
Lemma A.7 v satisfies the following properties:
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1. The output of algorithm 1 when run on v returns the partition:
{Qi}i = {Qt}t=1,...,T = {(t, kd) : k = 0, ..., d}t=1,...,T
2. For every t=1,...,T:
{e ∈ E : e ⊆ Qt} = Ecentert
Using Lemma A.7, we calculate:
v([m]) =
∑
t=1,...,T
v(Bt) =
∑
t=1,...,T
d
1
t
+ d(d− 1)(1
t
− )
=
∑
t=1,...T
[
d2
1
t
− d(d− 1)
]
= −Td(d− 1)+ d
∑
t=1,...,T
d
1
t
= −Td(d− 1)+ d
∑
t=1,...,T
v(Qt)
and by choosing  to be small enough this can be arbitrarily close to d
∑
t=1,...,T v(Qt) as required.

proof. [Of Lemma A.7] We prove the properties of the lemma by running the algorithm on the input
v. In the first iteration of step 3, the algorithm chooses
Q1 ∈ arg max
A⊆[m]
|A|=d+1
{v(A)}
which is exactly the set {(1, kd) : k = 0, ..., d} that contains in it all the edges in Ecenter1 , and has a weight
of d. Note that all edges in B1 have at least one endpoint in Q1, thus adding the items in B1 \Q1 to any
future Qt will not add any value to it. In a similar way one can see that in the t-th iteration of step 3 the
set that will be chosen as Qt will be {(t, kd) : k = 0, ..., d}, the edges strictly contained in it are exactly
Ecentert and it has a weight of exactly
d
t . 
B Omitted Proofs
B.1 Omitted Part of the Proof of Lemma 3.5
If |X| is not divisible by d+ 1, exactly one of the partition elements Q` is strictly smaller than d+ 1, and
hence there is exactly one index iˆ for which Tiˆ is not a multiple of d + 1. Denote r = |Tiˆ| mod (d + 1)
and ti =
|Ti|
d+1 . Define ri = |Si| mod (d + 1) and note that for all i ≤ iˆ, ri = r and for all i > iˆ, ri = 0.
Finally, denote si =
|Si|−ri
d+1 = b |Si|d+1c Now calculate:
∑
i
|Ti|
|Si| =
∑
i 6=iˆ
|Ti|
|Si| +
|Tiˆ|
|Siˆ|
≤
∑
i 6=iˆ
|Ti|
|Si| − ri + 1 =
∑
i 6=iˆ
ti
si
+ 1 ≤
∑
i
ti−1∑
j=0
1
si
+ 1
≤
∑
i
ti−1∑
j=0
1
si−j + 1 =
s1−1∑
j=0
1
s1−j + 1 = Hs1 + 1 ≤ Hb |X|d+1 c
+ 1
24
